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Abstract
The purpose of this research was to examine the potential for applying the
concept of real options to the DoD acquisition system. The key premise of real options is
the application of strategic decision making and flexibility in the face of future
uncertainties. This thesis sought to answer three research questions, how could real
options be applied to the acquisition system, how could the acquisition system benefit,
and what are the potential challenges to implementation within the acquisition system.
These research questions were addressed through a comprehensive literature and a case
study of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. The ORS initiative is a
transformational activity sponsored by the DoD to develop a strategy for deploying a
flexible and responsive satellite system architecture for meeting the direct needs of the
Combatant Commanders. Transcripts from interviews with six members of the ORS
initiative, representing senior decision makers and project leads, were reviewed to gain
insight into the goals and strategies of ORS. This research identified several consistent
themes in the execution of the ORS initiative that present opportunities for the
implementation of a real options framework in the defense acquisition system: the need
for a new business strategy; the need for flexibility in our systems and processes to
respond to future threats; and the need to exploit emerging capabilities and technologies.
The culmination of this research is recommendations for further study of the real options,
in particular how it might be codified for the use within the defense acquisition system.
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REAL OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK: A CASE
STUDY OF THE OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE INITIATIVE

I. Introduction

Research Motivation
On 21 January 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed Robert S. McNamara
as the 8th Secretary of Defense (Frank, 1999). Prior to his service as Secretary of
Defense, McNamara served as the President for Ford Motor Company. As Secretary of
Defense, McNamara sought to instill aspects from his corporate experience into the
Department of Defense (DoD) (Frank, 1999). He pushed for a structured management
control system for the DoD business processes, the results of which were the
Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Future Years Defense
Budget (FYDP), as depicted in Figure 1 (Frank, 1999). The institution of PPBS and
FYDP created a structured, analytical process for strategic decision making and
investment decisions. More than 40 years later, the processes are still used in the
management and execution of DoD resources (Glaros, 2003).
During McNamara’s era, the DoD’s principal concerns were the Soviet Union
threat and the spread of communism. These threats were well defined and the DoD’s
goals were very clear: nuclear deterrence and retaliation, containing the Warsaw Pact,
and being prepared for a Soviet Union advance through the Folda Gap. In the 21st
century, such certainty is not guaranteed. The events of 11 September 2001 were a stark
realization of this uncertainty and the bridge to a new age. Today, the DoD must deal
with a rapidly changing and uncertain landscape.
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Figure 1. PPBS Flow Chart (DoDI 7045.7)

To compete in this new landscape, the DoD must reevaluate its business
processes. The PPBS and the FYDP were viable during the 20th century, but in the 21st
century, the DoD must be able to keep pace with the speed of technological change and
the uncertainty of the global landscape. One possible means of effecting this
transformation is through the use of real options.
Real options is an analysis methodology for evaluating strategic investment
decisions regarding physical assets or projects. The methodology can be defined as
providing a right, but not an obligation, to take an action at sometime in the future for a
predetermined price (de Neufville, 2005a). This definition addresses the strategic nature
of the methodology, as it assigns greater value to projects with high degrees of flexibility
in the face of future uncertainty. This concept builds upon the theory and application of
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financial option valuation, applying the tenets of option valuation to the evaluation of
physical assets and projects. In practice, real options relies on formulations derived from
the Black-Scholes option pricing model (Rubash, 1996), a model described by Nobel
Laureates Myron Black and Fischer Scholes (Rubash, 1996).
A number of industries have adopted real options methodologies to their practice.
These industries are typically investment intensive, requiring large investments in
markets with uncertain returns (Triantis & Borison, 2001) – characteristics that also
describe the DoD. As a result of their operating environment and the need for managerial
flexibility, to remain competitive, these industries are driven to place a high value on
flexibility and stand to gain value from implementing real options, as described in Figure
2 (Copeland & Keenan, 1998a). Industries that have placed greater value on flexibility
have recognized the merits of real options as a systematic framework for strategic
management (Leslie & Michaels, 1997) and project valuation, as it recognizes the
inherent benefit of integrating flexibility and off-ramps in the decision making process
(Damodaran, 2005).

Figure 2. When Managerial Flexibility is Valuable (Copeland & Keenan, 1998a)
3

As the fundamental premise of real options is recognizing the value of strategic
flexibility in highly uncertain markets, it seems well suited to the 21st century security
environment. As the current and future security environment will be faced with uncertain
and asymmetric threats, the merits of this methodology reflect the type of change the
DoD is seeking in the transformation of its business processes.

Research Relevance
The events of 11 September 2001 were a catalyst for intense introspective
assessment and the impetus for tremendous change within the DoD. Alberts and Hayes
(2003) described this event as an “inflection point” in our history, marking the change to
the 21st century security environment. They further acknowledged that this new century
would face uncertainty and asymmetric threats to the security environment, intensified by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a more interconnected word (Alberts
& Hayes, 2003). These events awakened American citizenry to the uncertain future
presented by the 21st century. It also emboldened our government leadership to take
aggressive steps to change the DoD. Today, this change is referred as the Transformation
of the DoD (OASD(PA), 2005).
Since the establishment of the DoD, there have been numerous efforts to refine
and improve its business processes; in fact, the Defense Acquisition Performance
Assessment (DAPA) report identified 128 studies to improve the acquisition system
processes (DAPA, 2006). Each presidential administration has sought to provide the
correct course for the DoD. President George W. Bush identified the Transformation of
the of the DoD as a major initiative for his administration.
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Our Nation is entering a period of consequences - a time of rapid change
and momentous choices ... As President, I will give the Secretary a broad
mandate - to challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of
American defense for decades to come. (OASD(PA), 2005)

Alberts and Hayes’ (2003) notion of the extinction of the “symmetric Cold-War” era
echoed this mandate and recognized that the American military’s actions to organize,
train, and equip were mired in a Cold-War paradigm. Recently conceived processes such
as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) continued this
paradigm with a “slow and complex” process, which is considered ill suited for the
dynamic landscape driven by rapidly emerging needs from combat operations (DAPA,
2006).
The future threats to the United States would most likely not come from a large
conventional army, navy, or air force (OASD(PA), 2005). The United States and its
allies had prevailed in the Cold War but lack the readiness to face the future challenges of
an asymmetric threat, such as attacks on our shores or other unforeseen threats
(OASD(PA), 2005). Under the Bush Administration, this process of defense
transformation started in 2001 with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which
identified the necessary changes for the U.S. defense strategy (OASD(PA), 2005).
The 2001 QDR reflected the DoD’s views of the real changes needed in U.S.
defense strategy (OASD(PA), 2005). A key observation was the need to achieve a
balance between the development and acquisition of capabilities for the current war on
terror and investments in capabilities to address emerging threats (OASD(PA), 2005).
This hedge against potential threats and capabilities was a recognition that traditional
mechanisms, such as the PPBS and the FYDP, were not well suited for the dynamic and
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fluid nature of the current defense climate (Glaros, 2003). The DoD recognized the need
for strategic flexibility and organizational adaptability in response to future uncertainties
(Glaros, 2003).
The QDR presented the President and the Congress with a course for defense
transformation. The transformation of the DoD would seek to achieve greater flexibility
and adaptability in the services through an examination of the key issues for change:
“changes in roles, missions, and organizations; needed changes in the law; pursuit of key
enablers like space, information operations, surveillance systems, and special programs;
changes to our strategic nuclear forces; new approaches for developing a 21st century
civilian workforce; and improved business practices” (OASD(PA), 2005). These changes
would enable the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to achieve the goals of the
Defense Transformation initiative as presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Defense Policy Goals (OASD(PA), 2005)
Defense Policy Goals
1) The ability to respond to unexpected dangers and emerging threats to ourselves
or our allies
2) The ability to dissuade potential adversaries from developing or deploying
hostile capabilities
3) The ability to deter hostile acts or counter coercion
4) Should deterrence fail, the ability to defend the United States, our forces and
friends, and defeat any adversary on our own terms

Research Objectives
The DoD has recognized that the highly uncertain security environment of the 21st
century requires responsiveness and flexibility in its processes and operations. A real
options framework presents the DoD with the opportunity to maximize its value and
minimize its losses through a strategic application of flexibility. As Copeland and
6

Keenan (1998a) described, the DoD is an ideal environment for the application of real
options because its operating environment is highly uncertain and it places value in a high
degree of flexibility in its systems and processes. Based on these observations, this
research will explore the potential for implementing a real options framework for the
DoD acquisition system. The proposed framework considers the three approaches to
implementing real options as examined by Triantis and Borison (2001): as a way of
thinking, as an analytical tool, or as an organizational process. This framework will
afford the DoD the opportunity to scale an implementation of real options according to its
needs and desires.

Research Questions
The primary research question for this study is: “What are the opportunities for
implementing a real options framework within the DoD Acquisition System?” The
secondary research questions are as follows:
•

How can the acquisition system apply a real options framework?

•

How can the acquisition system benefit from a real options framework?

•

What are the challenges to effectively implementing a real options
framework?

Scope of Work
The focus of this research is a case study of the Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS) Tactical Satellite (TacSat) experiments. ORS is a transformational initiative being
undertaken by the DoD Office of Force Transformation (OFT). The ORS initiative
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addresses the first goal of the Defense Policy Goal; the ability to respond to unexpected
and emerging threats by providing a flexible and responsive space capability. The TacSat
experiments are an integral construct in the ORS strategy, providing a means for proofof-concept demonstrations and a test bed for new technologies.
This case study addresses the primary and secondary research questions by
conducting a comprehensive review of the ORS initiative and the TacSat experiments,
examining these efforts for elements of flexibility and optionality. This case study
involved the examination of two sources of data: program artifacts and interview
responses. Program artifacts were reviewed to gain insight into the principle and key
strategies for the execution of the ORS initiative and the TacSat programs. The interview
transcripts were reviewed to gain insight from program personnel on their perspectives on
the execution of flexible processes in the ORS initiative efforts and their thoughts on the
potential opportunities, benefits, and limitations for greater degrees of flexibility in the
acquisition system.

Thesis Structure
Chapter II, Literature Review, will provide a review of the theory and practice of
real options. The intent is to provide a perspective on the theory, utility, and potential
applications of this methodology by communities of interest and communities of practice.
A principal focus is the identification of strengths, limitations, and application by
practicing industries with similar motivations to the DoD. Chapter III, Methodology, will
describe the case study design and the rationale supporting the design choice. It will also
present the methodology for conducting interviews and analyzing the data collected.
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Chapter IV, Results, will present the results of this examination. The results will address
the findings and insights gained from the review of program documentation and program
personnel interviews. Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations, will present
conclusions reached as a result of the case study and literature review. From these
conclusions, recommendations for further action and future studies will be presented.
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II. Literature Review

Introduction
This chapter will examine the literature reviewed for the study of real options and
its benefits for the defense acquisition system. The chapter begins with a review of the
evolution of real options, charting its development from theory to practice. Following the
historical look, real options will be dissected to examine the key characteristics of the
methodology. Once the elements of real options have been described, this methodology
will be compared to more traditional tools, such as discounted cash flows and decision
tree analysis. Having compared real options with other tools, the use of real options in
industry will be evaluated: exploring methods of implementation and limitations. Lastly,
this chapter will examine the nascent efforts of the federal government to exploit real
options and the implications this has for the defense acquisition system.

Financial Options Pricing Theory
Option pricing theory is the established means for valuing financial options such
as stocks and commodities (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). At the heart of the option
pricing concept is the notion of the option, a "contract between two parties in which one
party has the right but not the obligation to do something, usually to buy or sell some
underlying asset" (Rubash, 1996). In the financial community, this right is identified as
either a “call” option (the right to buy something) or a “put” option (the right to sell
something) (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). Option pricing has been extensively studied
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and as a result has been widely accepted (Copeland & Keenan, 1998a, 1998b; Luehrman,
1998a, 1998b; Sammer, 2002; Triantis & Borison, 2001).
The theory behind option pricing can trace part of its legacy to the works of
Charles Caselli in 1877 with the publication of his book, “The Theory of Options in
Stocks and Shares” (Rubash, 1996). The reference to Caselli’s work cites it as providing
a public introduction to the concept of “hedging and speculation,” but lacking any
“monumental theoretical base” (Rubash, 1996). The true mathematical foundation began
with the mathematics dissertation of Louis Bachelier, “Theorie de la Speculation” (1900).
Bachelier’s work served as the foundation of subsequent mathematical works of Paul
Samuelson (1955), Richard Kruizenga (1956), and A. James Boness (1926).
Option theory took a large step forward in 1973 with the discussions and works of
Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and Robert Merton on “arbitrage-free” solutions and how
to value them (Copeland & Keenan, 1998a). The term “arbitrage-free” means that
securities with exactly the same risk and return problems should be identically priced
(Copeland & Keenan, 1998a), a key concept for option pricing and understanding real
options. Black and Scholes established their work building upon the foundation of
Boness’ (1926) dissertation (Rubash, 1996). Black and Scholes published works resulted
in the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model, for which they were subsequently awarded
the Nobel Prize in economics (1997) (Glaros, 2003).
The Black-Scholes model calculates a theoretical call value or call premium for
the option being evaluated. The following depicts the formulation of the Black-Scholes
model:
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C = SN (d1 ) − Ke ( − rt ) N (d 2 )

(1)

Where,
C = Call Value / Call Premium
S = Current Stock Price
t = Time Until Option Price Expires
K = Option Striking Price
r = Risk-Free Interest Rate
N = Cumulative Standard Normal Distribution
e = Exponential Term
d1 =

ln(S / K ) + (r + s 2 / 2)t

(2)

s t

d 2 = d1 − s t

(3)

Where,
s = Standard Deviation of Stock Returns
ln = Natural Logarithm

The Black-Scholes model can be conceptually described as two components. The first
operator SN(d1) “derives the expected benefit from acquiring a stock outright” (Rubash,
1996). The second operator Ke(-rt)N(d2) “gives the present value of paying the exercise
price on the expiration day” (Rubash, 1996).
Since its publication, the Black-Scholes Model has continued to evolve through
the contributions of other financial scholars, such as Robert Merton (1973, 1976) and
Jonathan Ingerson (1976). Each additional contribution has sought to expand the
methodology to address concepts not previously considered such as the distribution of
dividends from free cash flows.

Options Pricing To Real Options
The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model provides the theoretical basis for real
options (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). Real options apply the methodologies of option
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pricing, used in the evaluation of financial options, to physical assets and projects
(Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). Like financial options, real options give the owner of an
option the right to buy or sell an asset, at a certain price and within a specified time,
without the obligation to do so (Alleman, 2002). Leppard (2001) describes real options
as a series of techniques for assigning value to the strategic flexibility managers have in
the valuation of physical assets or projects. In the context of physical assets and projects,
real options allows for the recognition that uncertainty and the ability to respond to that
uncertainty can increase a project’s value, with greater uncertainty providing more
opportunity to create value (Faulkner, 1996).
The term “real options” was coined in the late 1970s by Stewart C. Myers, a
professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Sloan School of
Management (Mehta, 2005). Myers (1976) described real options in his paper
“Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” in which he examined the reasons why growth
companies borrow very little. Myers observed that these companies had growth options,
to which he asserted that growth companies had the ability or flexibility to observe
whether investment opportunities were positive and could then decide whether to invest.
The flexibility of this option provided additional value for the firm (Mehta, 2005). This
value is further increased as the uncertainty of the underlying asset increased (Myers,
1976).
There are several notable differences between financial options and real options.
Alleman (2002) characterized these difference by describing what is known and unknown
about each type of option. For financial options, the stock price, expiration date, and
strike price are well known and function in well-developed markets (Alleman, 2002). In
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contrast, real options lack the same well-developed market which makes it difficult to
determine the analog variables for stock price and strike price; furthermore, the notion of
a defined expiration date for a project is unlikely (Alleman, 2002). de Neufville (2003b)
and Alleman (2002) both noted that it is also difficult to determine the volatility for the
underlying risk asset for real options.

Anatomy of A Real Option
The similarity between financial options and real options extends to the types of
options as well. Like financial options, real options can be defined as either a “call”
option or a “put” option. “Call” options represent the right to buy the underlying asset at
a prescribed exercise price; they are evaluated on the relationship between the option
price and the exercise price. If the value of a “call” option exceeds the value of the
exercise price, the option is said to be “in-the-money” (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). If
the value of the exercise price exceeds the value of the “call” option, the option is
considered to be “out-of-the-money” (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). In contrast to a
“call” option, a “put” option represents the right to sell the underlying asset at a
prescribed exercise price.
Real options are also defined by the style of the option. The various styles of
options include American, European, Asian, and Bermuda. The discussions in this
review will focus on both American options and European options. American options
can be exercised at any point during its life before it expires (Copeland & Antikarov,
2001). Therefore, American options generally have a greater value as the option can be
exercised at any point, thereby allowing the option to be exercised at a point when the
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market volatility increases the option value the most. In contrast, European options can
only be exercised upon maturity of the option (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001) which may
cause it to possibly miss out on the potential for greater gains before option maturity.
Contrarian positions exist which suggests that a “rational” trader would not necessarily
exercise an American option early in an attempt to delay and gain more value on the
option (Sapienza, 2003).
The value of a real option is defined by six characteristics. Copeland and
Antikarov (2001) and Alleman (2002) agree on four of these basic characteristics.
Copeland and Antikarov (2001) add two additional characteristics, a project’s risk-free
interest rate and any potential dividends, to the list of characteristics. Each of the six
characteristics is described in Table 2.
The final element in the anatomy of a real option is the type of strategic action
taken on the underlying asset. These classifications of actions depict the type of
flexibility exercised in strategic decision making (Alleman, 2002; Copeland &
Antikarov, 2001). Alleman (2002) identifies several actions that might be exercised as
presented in Table 3. These actions reflect the strength of real options, which is the
ability to respond to the uncertainty of a project and its market conditions (Alleman,
2002). Leslie and Michaels (1997) and McGrath (1999) noted that this type of flexibility
can affect an organization’s perception of uncertainty and entrepreneurship, thus
changing management’s philosophy from one of “fear uncertainty and minimize
investment” to “seek gains from uncertainty and maximize learning.”
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Table 2 Characteristics of a Real Option
Characteristics
1) The value of the underlying asset: the value of the physical asset,
“whether it is a project, investment or acquisition”.

Effect on Value
Increases

2) The exercise price: the money that will be spent if a call option is
exercised or the money to be gained if a put option is exercised.

Decreases

3) The time to expiration of the option: The duration of time that the
option is available to be exercised, with longer durations creating
greater value.

Increases

4) The volatility of the market for the underlying asset: The risk of the
underlying asset in the market, with higher degrees of market
uncertainty generating greater value because of the potential for
greater upside benefits.

Increases

5) The risk-free rate of interest for the life of the option: As the risk-free
rate increases so to does the value of the options.

Increases

6) The dividends that may be paid out from the underlying asset: If
dividends are paid the value of the option will be impacted.

Decreases

In addition to these simple actions, there are more complex interactions of
options; these are referred to as compound options, rainbow options and compound
rainbow options. Compound options are described as options on options (Copeland &
Antikarov, 2001). In a compound option, the options available to a manager are
contingent upon the options from previous phases of the project. Research &
development (R&D) efforts are representative of the type of effort that might contain
compound options. R&D efforts typically involve multiple phases such as design phase,
engineering phase, test phase, and a production phase. Each phase contains the option to
abandon, defer, switch, or contract at the end of the phase, before committing to any
follow-on activities. Rainbow options are described as options driven by multiple
sources of uncertainty (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). Finally, there are compound
rainbow options. A compound rainbow option is an option driven by multiple sources of
uncertainty containing options on options (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001).
16

Table 3 Types of Real Options and Descriptions
Type of Option
Reference
an American call option to delay the start (Alleman, 2002)
of a project, giving management the
(Copeland & Antikarov, 2001)
opportunity to await the return of a
favorable or “good” state of nature

Defer

Abandon

Contract

an American put option which can be
exercised at a predetermined fixed price,
to salvage some value from an poorly
performing project

(Alleman, 2002)

option to sell part of a project for a fixed
price and downsizing the remaining
operations, if the market conditions are in
a down state

(Alleman, 2002)

(Copeland & Antikarov, 2001)

(Copeland & Antikarov, 2001)

Expand

Option to pay more to scale up the project, (Alleman, 2002)
allowing operations to take advantage of
(Copeland & Antikarov, 2001)
markets in an up state

Switch

Option to exercise a portfolio of call and
put options, which enable switching
between different modes of operation for
a fixed cost.

(Alleman, 2002)

Shutdown and
Restart

Option to shutdown and restart is the
ability to cease or resume operations of at
fixed cost predicated upon the state of the
prevailing markets.

(Alleman, 2002)

Growth

Option to take advantage of future
interrelated opportunities

(Alleman, 2002)

Real Options or Discounted Cash Flow
Discounted cash flow (DCF) and net present value (NPV) are traditional tools
used for evaluation of projects and investment decisions. This method determines project
value by discounting expected future cash flows at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate and
then subtracts the cost of any investments (Copeland & Keenan, 1998a). The resulting
value of this calculation is the project’s NPV. Projects are then evaluated on the
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determined NPV. Projects with a positive NPV are accepted and projects with a negative
NPV are rejected (Copeland & Keenan, 1998a).
The NPV is a function of free cash flows, the duration of the project, and the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). WACC is defined as the after-tax marginal
cost of capital (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). The formula for determining NPV is
presented below.

N

NPV = − I + ∑
t =1

E ( FCF )
(1 + WACC ) t

(4)

Where,
NPV = Net Present Value
I = Initial Investment
t = Life Expectancy of Project (Start =1, to Finish=N)
E(FCF) = Expected Free-Cash Flow
WACC= Weighted Average Cost of Capital

A limitation of the NPV formulation is that it does not assign a value to the capability of
management to make certain strategic decisions (abandon, defer, shutdown, etc.) during
the course of a project’s life cycle. Harvey (1999) noted that these strategic options, are
truly real options and do not generate value in standard DCF. These strategic decisions
have a value which may alter the decisions made regarding a project’s viability.
A simple example illustrates the difference that strategic flexibility has in project
valuation (Harvey, 1999). The example contrasts a DCF evaluation, described in Figures
3, with a real options evaluation, described in Figure 5. The project timelines and
project cash flows for this example are depicted in Figure 4.
In Figures 3 and 4, following the initial investment there is a 30% probability that
the project will experience bad market conditions, at which management could change
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the projects course. Following the second investment two additional decision points are
created. In the upstate, the decision point leads to either an 80% probability of success or
a 20% probability of failure. In the downstate, the decision point leads to either a 20%
probability of success or an 80% probability of failure. The DCF method evaluates the
project decision tree with the assumption that all events depicted will occur. The real
options evaluation depicts management’s flexibility to respond to market uncertainty.

Suppose a clothing company is considering introducing a new line
of fashion. The project has a two year life. An initial investment of $50
(cash flows are in thousands) is required to fund a year-long development
phase. At the end of a year, a further $50 is required for production and
cash inflows from sales (net of selling expenses) will occur at the end of
the second year.
There is some uncertainty about the amount of the cash inflows
since it is unclear whether the market will embrace the new line. The firm
currently believes that there is a 70% chance that the new line will be a
winner. They also believe that the direction of fashions will become more
apparent over the next year. In particular, there is an 80% chance that
the direction over the next year will continue over the subsequent year.
This uncertainty, and the associated cash flows, are presented in
Figure 4. Suppose also that the required return on projects of this type is
10%.
Standard capital budgeting techniques involve computing the
expected net present value (NPV) as:
E[ NPV ] = −50 +

E[ NPV ] = −4.38

− 50 0.7(0.8(200) + 0.2(120)) + 0.3(0.2(90) − 0.8(100))
+
1.1
1.12

In which case the project would be rejected.
Figure 3. Abandonment Example, NPV (Harvey, 1999)
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Figure 4. Abandonment Example, Decision Tree (Harvey, 1999)

Consider, however, the case where the firm has the option to abandon the
project after the first year. In this case, the second phase of the project
would only proceed if the market direction was favorable over the first
year. If the market direction was unfavorable, the firm would abandon the
project, since proceeding would cost a further $50 and the expected
present value (at time 1) of the case inflow is
(0.2(90)-0.8(100)) / 1.1 = -$56.36.
Therefore, when the option is considered, the expected NPV is:
E[ NPV ] = −50 +

0.7(−50) 0.7(0.8(200) + 0.2(120)) + 0.3(0)
+
= +20
1.1
1.12

And the project should proceed.
Figure 5. Abandonment Example, Real Options (Harvey, 1999)

Although this example is simple, it reveals the inherent value of being able to
exercise the real option of abandoning a project if the results indicate a loss. In this
example, the NPV improves from -$4.38 to $20 which would result in the approval of the
project. It is also important to recognize that the simplified nature of this example
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overlooks the fact that the discount rate of the project would vary since the project is not
as risky with the option to abandon under unfavorable market conditions (Harvey, 1999).

Real Options or Decision Tree Analysis

Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) or Decision Analysis (DA) is another of the
traditional tools used for the valuation of projects. Copeland and Keenan (1998a)
describe DTA as a tree structure depicting all possible states of a project, the probabilities
of occurrence for each state, and the decisions management can take in response to these
states. The tree is evaluated by discounting the expected cash flows, a function of the
probabilities of occurrence, with an appropriately selected discount rate (Copeland &
Keenan, 1998a).
An advantage of DTA is its graphical depiction of the project, decision points,
and probabilities; which facilitate an ease of explanation and understanding. Unlike
DCF, DTA actively assesses the uncertainty of the project life and management’s ability
to respond to these uncertainties, as depicted in Figure 6. Decision analysis and real
options would appear to produce the same results; both methods map out the possible
outcomes of the project, accounting for project uncertainty and recognizing
management’s flexibility to respond to this uncertainty. In this regard, decision analysis
and real options valuation are closely related, as decision analysis can lead to options
analysis. However, the two approaches differ on the discount rate used for the valuation.
Decision analysis uses a constant discount rate for the entire project; while real options
adjusts the discount rate at each point of the project (Copeland & Keenan, 1998b). By
adjusting the discount rate, the evaluation more realistically accounts for the changes in
risk at the various stages of the project (Copeland & Keenan, 1998b).
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Figure 6. Decision Tree Analysis (Kirkwood, 2002)

Recent Considerations For Real Options

As described, real options provide management with the ability to assess a
project’s potential value accounting for flexibility and management choices. This
assessment requires little insight into the actual technical details of the project, treating
the inner workings of the project like a “black-box” (de Neufville, 2003a). This
traditional view of real options is described as real options “on,” because it strictly
evaluates the strategic options (to open, close, delay, etc.) of a project without
consideration for the technical aspects of the project (de Neufville, 2003a). This view of
real options has progressed as the field of systems engineering has begun exploration of
the potential uses of real options in the design of complex systems.
The systems engineering community has recently addressed the concept of real
options “in” for evaluating the technical aspects of system design. This option valuation
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methodology assumes the perspective of a system engineer versed in the technical details
of the project. As such, the valuation focuses on the technical options available for the
design of the system. Real options “in” differs from other options because knowledge of
the system is required (de Neufville, 2005a). The recent exploration of real options “in”
changes the paradigm of system engineering and system design, thereby placing greater
value in flexible designs. de Neufville (2005b) asserts that the ability to respond to future
uncertainties with flexible designs offers improvements over the traditional approach of
design optimization and design to specification.

Real Options in Practice

Real options have been adopted by numerous industries, replacing or
supplementing traditional methods of project valuation such as DCF and DTA. Triantis
and Borison (2001) noted that many firms are drawn to the notion of real options over
concerns of management’s tendency to overvalue, overpay, and over invest in projects or
other corporate investments, as these firms are motivated to capitalize on fleeting
economic opportunities and establish market leadership positions. In addition to the
notion of commonly expressed concerns and motivations, firms using real options share
several common traits. These traits have been described by Triantis and Borison (2001),
Leslie and Michaels (1997), and Copeland and Keenan (1998b) in their respective studies
on the application of real options, and are summarized in Table 4.
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1)

Table 4 Common Traits of Firms Using Real Options
Common Industry Traits
Investment intensive industries

2)

Large investments with uncertain returns

3)

Traditional valuation models are inadequate

4)

Engineering sciences needing sophisticated analytical tools

5)

Phased developments

6)

Cyclical processes

The early acceptance of real options was markedly slow, as only a few industries
implemented this methodology, namely pharmaceuticals and oil and natural gas
exploration firms (Mehta, 2005). Early adoption of real options was hampered by its
complexity (Mehta, 2005). As firms have become more familiar with the theory and
methodology, more have sought to integrate this tool into their practices. The variety and
scope of industries and firms currently employing real options has grown and represents a
diverse group of firms, as presented in Table 5 (Alleman, 2002; Copeland & Antikarov,
2001; Faulkner, 1996; LCDR Cesar G. Rios, Housel, & Mun, 2006; Triantis & Borison,
2001).

24

Table 5 Industries and Firms Using ROM
Industries
Firms
Consumer and Industrial Products
Dupont, LLBean, Proctor & Gamble, Unilever
Consulting and Financial Services

Credit Suisse First Boston, Morgan Stanley, Stern
Stewart & Company

Engineering Services, High Technology
and Infocom

Cadence Design Inc, Hewlett Packard, Intel, Kodak,
M/A-COM, Motorola, Rockwell, Seagate, Sprint,
Ultratech

Life Services, Biotechnology,
Pharmaceuticals

Amgen, Genentech, Genzyme, Merck, Pfizer

Energy, Natural Resources

Anadarko, British Petroleum, Chevron, Cinergy,
ConEdison, Conoco, Constellation Energy Group,
Dynegy, El Paso, Enron, Lakeland Electric, Ontario
Power Generation, Peaker-Plants, Shell, Texaco,
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Xcel Energy

Real Estate, Homebuilding

Beaser Homes

Aeronautics, Automotive, Transportation

Airbus, Boeing, British Airways, Canadian Pacific,
General Motors

Real Options Frameworks

As the number of firms employing real options grows, so too does the opportunity
to explore different methods of using this strategic management tool. Although initially
conceived as a quantitative tool for project valuation, the deployment of real options in
organizations has evolved. In a study of 39 organizations, Triantis and Borison (2001)
categorized the techniques employed by firms to implement real options as a way of
thinking, as an analytical tool, and as an organizational process. The notion of real
options as more than an analytical tool is furthered in McGrath’s (1999) and McGrath
and MacMillian’s (2000) description of real options reasoning, which they describe as “a
logic for funding projects that maximizes learning and access to upside opportunities
while containing costs and downside risk.” Luehrman (1998b), Copeland and Antikarov
(2001), and Leppard (2001) also describe different quantitative approaches for the

25

determination of a real options value. Although each approach is based on the works of
the Black-Scholes option pricing model, the methods of determination varied.
Luehrman (1998a) describes an option space defined by two metrics, value-tocost and volatility. These metrics are evaluated using Black-Scholes Option-Pricing
model data and graphed to represent option value, such as in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Option Space (Luehrman, 1998b)

Copeland and Antikarov (2001) evaluate option values using binomial and
multinomial lattices evaluated with either a replicating portfolio method, as depicted in
Figure 8, or a risk neutral probability method. Both of these approaches are derived from
practices and calculations used in financial operations to evaluate stock option values.
Leppard (2001) describes a diagrammatic technique for the valuation of fixed
assets, defined by a three-dimensional state space for option value. The stated intent of
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this methodology is to provide a common ground between analysts and non-mathematical
business practitioners for discussing option value. Figure 9 depicts an American “put”
option displayed using a diagrammatic approach.
McGrath and MacMillan (2000) present a logic-based framework for the
evaluation of technologies. The process involves the use of their Strategic Technology
Assessment Review (STAR). The STAR process is constructed around a series of survey
questions, which are identified as factors in determining the value of technology options.
Each factor depicted in Figure 10 is evaluated with a series of questions using a sevenpoint Likert scale. The survey question responses are evaluated using STAR to
determine the value of the option.

Figure 8. Binomial Decision Tree (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001)
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Figure 9. American Put Option Diagram (Leppard, 2001)

Figure 10. Factors Influencing Technology Option Value
(McGrath & MacMillan, 2000)
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Practical Limitations to Real Options

Real options provide a powerful alternative to the traditional means of project
valuation. However, there are limitations; as Professor Stewart Myers once stated,
“quantification of option value can be quite difficult” (Mehta, 2005). This is particularly
true for large projects with numerous options; as the number and combination of options
grow, so to does the complexity of the option valuation (Kemna, 1993).
Additionally, the uncertainty of the underlying project is difficult to determine (de
Neufville, 2003b; Kemna, 1993). In financial options, there is extensive statistical
history to evaluate in order to determine the options uncertainty. However, with projects
there is generally little historical precedent to rely upon to generate an appropriate
measure of uncertainty (de Neufville, 2003b).

Real Options in the Federal Government

Despite these limitations, an increasing number of firms have explored the subject
of real options (Sammer, 2002; Triantis & Borison, 2001). Organizations within the
federal government have also explored the utility of real options, to include the Navy and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (Davis, 2003; Gregor, 2003;
LCDR Cesar G. Rios et al., 2006; Shishko, Ebbler, & G., 2003). The Navy’s
examinations of real options have included analysis of real options in systems design and
as a management framework for its Information Technology (IT) portfolio management
efforts.
Gregor’s (2003) research in the ocean engineering department at MIT was
motivated by the need to design ships to contend with the uncertainty of changing
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missions, threats, and technologies. Gregor (2003) utilized the concepts of real options
“in” to identify and evaluate the options available for the design and acquisition of a new
naval ship. Gregor (2003) concluded that analytical methods of real options could be
applied, with many assumptions, to the design and acquisition of naval ships in the public
sector, although not with the same certainty of a financial options.
The Navy has also conducted research into the application of real options for
management of its IT Portfolio, employing real options as a management tool for future
investments (Davis, 2003; Rios, Housel, & Mun, 2006). Davis (2003) identified that the
Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) endorsed the use of IT Portfolio Management
(ITPM) for the management of IT investments. He further noted that the use of ITPM
relied upon traditional methods of investment valuations, such as NPV, Earned Value
Analysis (EVA), and Internal Rate of Return (IRR); and proposed real options as an
alternative methodology. Davis (2003) concluded that the use of real options offered an
alternative tool for investments involving uncertainty without significantly expanding the
information requirements or administrative needs. Rios et al., (2006) also investigated
the use of real options for ITPM. Specifically, they examined the Knowledge Value
Added/Real Options (KVA+RO) valuation framework for use in an integrated portfolio
analysis for Intelligence Information systems (Rios et al., 2006). They concluded that the
KVA+RO framework offered a “powerful” tool for use within governments and
corporate industries (Rios et al., 2006).
NASA has also explored the concept of real options for technology assessment.
NASA’s efforts focused on the use of the real options methodology in evaluating and
providing design choices for technology for satellite and space systems (Shishko et al.,
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2003). In their examination, NASA employed a modified version of the Black-Scholes
model tailored to address the unique aspects of their technology projects..
The Office of Force Transformation (OFT) has also espoused the benefits of real
options for use in defense, suggesting that tools such as the Programming, Planning, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) are inadequate
for the current and future security environment (Glaros, 2003). Glaros (2003)
specifically noted that the needs in defense are not significantly different from those of
the commercial marketplace, “mitigation of risk by hedging against uncertainty, brought
about by rapid dynamics changes.” In the context of the defense environment, Glaros
(2003) suggested that real options add strategic value by providing alternative courses of
action for decision makers, such as designing requirements based on the value of
flexibility. Glaros (2003) suggested that a real options framework has significant value
for leadership within the acquisition system, in light of the development cycles of
acquisition programs, by providing the flexibility to cancel or defer projects at any stage
to mitigate risk and increase potential. The concept of real options has also prompted the
consideration of alternative strategies for defense investments. The former director of
OFT, Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, identified such opportunities to the Armed Services
Committee in his comments on strategic forces:

As we move towards the age of the small, the fast and the many, it’s time to start
thinking about applying that movement to our model for space. Adopting this
complementary and broader business model will help us ensure space superiority
well into a future where space will be yet more responsive to our joint military
forces. In short, it is within our capability to create options, a process which itself
can be a competitive advantage.
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The intent and results of these efforts and comments demonstrate the utility of a real
options framework for the Department of Defense (DoD). However, as proposed by
Ceylan and Ford (2002), implementation of an options framework for defense acquisition
requires a structured approach for the description, design, assessment, and use of options
based on current practices. This proposed implementation would require policy and
guidance necessary to integrate it into the acquisition framework.

DoD Acquisition Framework

The current acquisition framework is governed by three distinct, but interrelated,
processes as described by the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA)
report (DAPA, 2006). The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) process governs the generation of requirements and the determination of the best
means to satisfy these needs. The defense acquisition system describes the acquisition
framework for executing the procurement and modification of weapon systems. Finally,
the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system authorizes,
appropriates and manages the resources necessary for the execution of the requirements
and acquisition processes. The DAPA report defines the interaction of these processes as
the big “A,” Acquisition System (DAPA, 2006).
Joint Capabilities Integration And Development System

The JCIDS process as deployed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
is described in CJCSI 3170.01E. The JICDS process is described as a “joint conceptscentric capabilities identification process” to prioritize and identify the capabilities
required by the joint forces (CJCS, 2005). The process is intended to be top-down,
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linking the National Security Strategy to the requirements and capability needs of the
joint forces, as displayed in Figure 11.
JCIDS is a collaborative and capabilities-based process, employing joint concept
of operations to define and prioritize capability gaps and determine the means to resolve
these capability gaps. The process involves functional analyses and identification of
needs in the context of existing Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership
and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) and determines whether resolution
of these needs requires a materiel or non-materiel solution; or a change to DOTLPF. The
identification of a materiel solution initiates action in the acquisition system to develop
and acquire the solution.
Defense Acquisition System

The acquisition system is governed by DoDI 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition
System, and by DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. These
documents define the intent of the acquisition system which is to be flexible, responsive,
innovative, disciplined, streamlined, and effective in the execution of a system’s
acquisition (USD(AT&L), 2003a). These documents also deploy the defense acquisition
management framework, which defines the key decision milestones and execution phases
for pre-systems acquisition, systems acquisition, and sustainment, as displayed in Figure
12. This framework is managed by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the
individual with overall program responsibility and authority; and the Program Manager
(PM), the individual appointed to execute the program. The milestones represent
checkpoints for the MDA to evaluate progress and determine whether a project continues
to a subsequent phase (USD(AT&L), 2003a). The phases represent different stages of a
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program’s development, from concept initiation to system retirement. The execution of
program phases is managed by the PM.
Essential additions to this management framework are the concepts of
evolutionary acquisition and spiral development. Evolutionary acquisition is a strategic
process for the incremental delivery of capability, balancing the needs of the user and the
resources available to satisfy those needs – stressing rapid and iterative delivery of
increasing levels of capability (USD(AT&L), 2003b). Spiral development is the means
to achieving an evolutionary capability; in which requirements are identified but the endstate of the program is not defined, allowing for iteration with the user throughout the
program s development (USD(AT&L), 2003b).
Programming, Planning, Budgeting and Execution

The PPBE system is designed to generate a plan, as well program and budget for
DoD programs and initiatives. It is a cyclical process operating in two-year cycles, which
allows for the planning of future efforts and the review of on-going efforts in the context
of the current environment (ASD(C), 1984). This decision making framework provides
the DoD with a means to plan, program, budget, and execute investment strategies. The
resources appropriated by the PPBE are defined by the DoD Financial Management
Regulation 7000.14-R.
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Figure 11. Top Down Capability Need Identification Process
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Figure 12. Defense Acquisition Management Framework
(USD(AT&L), 2003b)

36

The principal fund types appropriated for DoD acquisition programs are
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E); Procurement; and Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) (Carroll, 2003). Each fund type must be obligated and
expended within a specified timeframe, governed by the fund type and the date of
obligation, as presented in Table 6. Any funds that are not obligated within the specified
time expire and any funds not expended within the specified time are canceled (Carroll,
2003).

Table 6 DoD Fund Types and Execution Requirements (Carroll, 2003)
Appropriation Type
Budget Execution
Obligation

RDT&E
2 Yrs

Procurement
3 Yrs

O&M
1 Yrs

Military Construction
5 Yrs

Expenditure

5 Yrs

5 Yrs

5 Yrs

5 Yrs

Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment

In June 2005, Gordon England, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense, chartered
the DAPA project to develop an action plan for transforming the acquisition system.
Reacting to the continued concern of cost overruns, schedule delays, and the urgent need
to provide a system responsive to the demands of the 21st century, he initiated a “carte
blanche” assessment to review and improve the defense acquisition processes (DAPA,
2006). In his memo to the members chartered to lead the DAPA project, Secretary
England established the trade space to be considered in the review and recommendations.
He authorized a comprehensive assessment considering all aspects of the acquisition
process: requirements, organization, legal foundations, decision methodology, oversight,
and checks and balances (DAPA, 2006).

37

The DAPA project represented the first comprehensive and integrated assessment
of the acquisition process, exploring the budgeting processes, the requirement processes,
and the acquisition processes in total. The charter of the DAPA project was to provide
the recommendations needed for the radical transformation of the acquisition system to
better operate in the new security environment of the 21st century. The goal of the study
was to construct an integrated acquisition system able to deal with the unstable external
climate, the rapidly evolving security environment, and the need to be agile and flexible
in the face of a wide spectrum of potential conflicts (DAPA, 2006).
The DAPA panel members described the big “A” Acquisition System as the
integrated framework of the JCIDS process, the acquisition management framework, and
the PPBE (DAPA, 2006). With this construct, the DAPA panel members suggested that
the activities of any acquisition effort are governed by the interaction of this big “A”
framework. To that end, the panel members asserted that the framework is fragmented,
being pulled apart by conflicting interests and competing values as depicted in Figure 13
(DAPA, 2006).
The DAPA panel built upon this framework to shape the context of the
deficiencies of the acquisition system. Within this context, the panel members provided a
set of comprehensive recommendations, addressing critical areas for improvements in
each element of the Acquisition System framework. The recommendations from the
DAPA panel members addressed organization, workforce, budget, requirements,
acquisition, and industry, as described in Figure 14. These recommendations represent
the potential for a significant departure from the norms of the acquisition system.
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Figure 13. Acquisition System Framework (DAPA, 2006)
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Organization
- Realign authority, accountability and responsibility at the appropriate level and
streamline the acquisition oversight process.

- Establish dedicated Four-Star Acquisition Systems Commands, at the Service level.
Workforce
- Rebuild and value the acquisition workforce, and incentivized leadership.
Budget
- Transform the Planning, Programming and Budgeting process and establish a distinct
Stable Program Funding Account.
Requirements
- Replace the Joint Capability Integration and Development System with the Joint
Capabilities Acquisition and Divestment Plan (a Combatant Commander-led
requirements process in which the Services and Defense Agencies compete to provide
solutions.)

- Establish a two-year recurring process to produce an integrated, time-phased and
fiscally-informed Joint Capability Acquisition and Divestment plan and a continuous
Materiel Solutions Plan Development Process to identify and initiate development of
Materiel Solutions
- Add an “Operationally Acceptable” test evaluation category.
- Give program managers explicit authority to defer non-Key Performance Parameter
requirements to later spirals or block upgrades.
Acquisition
- Adopt a risk-based source selection process.

- Shift to time-certain development procedures and make schedule a Key Performance
Parameter.
- Mandate a time start and end dates that are clearly defined and revamp the acquisition
processes to support it.
Industry
- Overcome the consequences of reduced demand by sharing long range plans and
restructuring competitions for new programs.

- Require government insight and favor formal competition for major subsystems when a
Lead System Integrator acquisition strategy is pursued.
Figure 14. DAPA Report Recommendations: Budget, Requirements, Acquisition
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Summary

This chapter reviewed the history and current state of practice for real options.
The review addressed the merits of real options over other traditional project valuation
methods. A discussion was also offered of the various frameworks used in the
application of real options. The defense acquisition system framework was also reviewed
to provide a context for the application of a real options methodology. Finally, a
discussion was offered on the changes necessary for change as recommended by the
DAPA panel. The following chapters will address the methodology, results and
conclusions of this study.
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III. Methodology

Introduction

The focus of this research was a case study of the Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) initiative and the Tactical Satellite (TacSat) experiments. ORS is a
transformational initiative being undertaken by the DoD Office of Force Transformation
(OFT) to demonstrate a systems architecture for providing flexible and responsive
tactical satellite capability for the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) and their forces at
the operational and tactical level of combat. To demonstrate this capability, several
tactical satellite (TacSat) experiments are being conducted to demonstrate technologies
and concepts identified in the ORS vision.
This case study examined the strategy and execution of this initiative in the
context of a real options framework. In particular, the study focused on elements of the
ORS initiative that identify opportunities for flexibility in the acquisition system. The
objective of this research was to qualify the opportunities, benefits, and challenges for the
implementation of flexibility in the ORS initiative and present observations for the
application of similar levels of flexibility in the acquisition system framework.
This chapter addresses the case study design and application of the case study
protocol. The review will cover the rationale for the design, the methods of data
collection, and the procedures for analyzing the data. Finally, an overview of the ORS
initiative and the TacSat experiments provide background information for the case study.

42

Research Objectives

Given the DoD's recognition of the highly uncertain security environment of the
21st century and the need for responsiveness and flexibility in its processes and
operations, the systematic framework of real options offers a potential tool to addresses
these needs. As suggested by Glaros (2003), the DoD stands to gain substantial benefit
from the implementation of a real options framework. This notion is further supported by
the proposition presented by Copeland and Keenan (1998a) that organizations operating
in a highly uncertain environment and executing with a high degree of managerial
flexibility may realize additional value from the real options methodology. Based on
these observations, this research explores the potential for implementing a real options
framework for the DoD acquisition system. The proposed framework considers the
approaches to implementing real options as examined by Triantis and Borison (2001): as
a way of thinking, as an analytical tool or as an organizational process.
The intent of this study is to explore the opportunities to apply this real options
framework to an acquisition system. The primary research question for this study is:
“What are the opportunities for implementing a real options framework within the DoD
Acquisition System?” The secondary research questions are as follows:
•

How can the acquisition system apply a real options framework?

•

How can the acquisition system benefit from a real options framework?

•

What are the challenges to effectively implementing a real options
framework?
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Case Study Design

The purpose of this case study was to examine the enabling components of the
ORS initiative and the TacSat experiments, such as stakeholders, program structure, and
institutional processes, to identify elements within the program exhibiting flexibility or
favorable to the implementation of flexibility. To conduct this study, an exploratory,
single-case design was chosen. There were three items considered in selecting this
method of study, the type of questions asked, the type of case study, and the choice of
study design.
The primary consideration in the design of the study method was the type of
questions being studied. Yin (2003) suggested that case studies are most appropriate for
studies addressing “how” and “why” questions, although there is latitude for “what”
questions. As the primary and secondary research questions for this study focus on both
“how” and “what” questions, the researcher initially considered the choice of a case study
approach to be a valid decision. However, Yin (2003) also suggested the components
that guide the choice of study methods also consider the amount of control over
environmental behavior and whether the study is historical or contemporary. Although
not initially considered when evaluating the research method, the contemporary nature of
the case study subject and the environment in which it was conducted both conform to
the components identified. As the components and focus of this study correspond with
those identified by Yin (2003), the selection of a case study design was judged to be a
valid choice.
The second consideration in the design was the type of case study to be
conducted. Yin (2003) identified three types of case studies: descriptive, explanatory,
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and exploratory. Descriptive case studies attempt to describe a theory, covering the study
subject extensively (Yin, 2003). Explanatory case studies attempt to identify a causal
relationship regarding the subject of study and certain factors (Yin, 2003). Exploratory
case studies involve areas of study where there is uncertainty or there is little information
available on the subject (Yin, 2003). An exploratory case study was chosen because very
little literature or data exists on the subject of real options in the DoD.
The final consideration was the choice of a multiple or single case design. A
single case design was chosen for this study because of the investigational nature of the
ORS initiative and the TacSat experiments. Yin (2003) identified five circumstances
when a single-case is valid:
1) the case is a critical case for proving a well-formulated theory;
2) the case is an extreme or unique case;
3) the case is typical;
4) the case is revelatory and provides an opportunity to observe a previously
unobserved event;
5) the case is a longitudinal case.

As there are currently no comparable acquisition efforts, the ORS initiative offers the
opportunity to observe new strategies and philosophies for the acquisition system; as
such, the choice of a single-case was judged to be valid.
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Information Source

The two sources of data utilized for this case study were artifacts and interviews.
The artifacts available for this study consisted of program documentation on the ORS
initiative and the TacSat experiments. The available documentation included items such
as the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Congressional Hearing reports,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) conference papers, and
drafts of the 120-Day Operationally Responsive Space Study. The focus of the artifact
data review was the identification of strategies and goals related to the premise of
flexibility in systems and processes.
Interview data was provided by Captain Jason Bartolomei from his research on
“Dynamic Utility in Design.” The interview data consisted of interview transcripts for
several interviews and the investigative questions used for the interviews. The interviews
were conducted with six subjects from the OFT and the AFRL TacSat program. The six
subjects interviewed had extensive knowledge on the goals and strategies of the ORS
initiative. The subjects were recognized leaders involved in the development of the ORS
initiative or members actively responsible for its execution. Each subject offered insights
from a position of authority or accountability. The objective of the interviews was to
identify areas conducive to the implementation of real options or presently exhibiting
similar tenets of flexibility, by exploring the enabling elements of the ORS initiative,
such as processes, organizational structure, and stakeholder relationships.
The form of the investigative questions for the interviews was well structured;
however, the results of the interviews were atypical of what would have been expected.
The form and structure of the transcripts were general discussions, as opposed to the
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question-response interactions, which were not as well focused as the investigative
questions would suggest. In total, 261 pages of discussion transcripts were provided,
covering the conversations with each of the six subjects.

Interview Data Analysis

The interview transcripts consisted of five structured interviews conducted with
personnel involved in the ORS initiative. A total of six participants were selected from
the OFT and the AFRL TacSat program. The personnel who participated in the
interviews were identified as members with a clear knowledge of the strategy and goals
of the ORS initiative and an exhaustive understating of the TacSat experiments.
The interviews consisted of a series of open-ended discussions. The interviews
were guided by a series of investigative questions focused on nine categories of interest
and several additional key questions. The investigative questions were provided to the
interview subjects in advance of the interviews to allow the subjects to familiarize
themselves with the focus of the research and prepare for the actual interviews. The
interviews were subsequently conducted as free-flowing discussions guided by the intent
of the investigative questions. This free-flowing nature was captured in the interview
transcripts, as the transcripts were structured like the flow of a discussion and less like a
question-answer investigation.
The overall objective of the interviews was to explore the ORS framework and
identify opportunities to implement the concepts and methodologies of real options. The
interviews with the subjects from the OFT focused on the strategy, goals, and intent of
the ORS initiative with a specific focus on the concept of flexibility and responsiveness
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in the acquisition processes. The interviews with the subjects from the TacSat programs
focused on the requirements, expectations and execution of the tactical experiments; they
provided extensive insight into the technical details of each experiment.
Investigative Questions

Seventy-nine questions were developed by the original Captain Bartolomei to
investigate the use or potential application of real options. The questions were grouped
into nine specific categories: system stakeholders, organization, system objectives,
system activities, engineered system, system drivers, acquisition strategy, contract
strategy, and program execution. An example of the types of investigative questions
asked regarding system drivers is provided in Table 7. The full list of investigative
questions is given in Appendix 1.

Table 7 Sample Investigative Questions
System Driver Questions
1) What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the system objectives?
2) What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the organization?
3) What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the engineered system?
4) What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the activities?
5) What is the nature of these interactions?
6) How rapidly is the technology supporting the system changing?
7) How have the operational requirements for the system changed, likely to change?
8) What was the impetus of these changes?
9) What are your greatest cost risks? Schedule risks? Performance risks?
10) What do you consider the greatest impediments to your program’s success? (FAR, Cost
Instability, Organization)
11) What do you consider the greatest enablers?
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The researcher identified specific themes in each category of questions and
further segregated the questions into three themes. The themes were social interactions,
systems engineering and systems acquisition. The organization of the investigative
question themes and categories is presented in Table 8.

Table 8 Themes and Categories for Investigative Questions
Social Interaction
Systems Engineering Systems Acquisition
Organization
System Objectives
Acquisition Strategy
System Stakeholders

System Activities

Contract Strategy

Engineered System

Program Execution

System Drivers

Interview Data Analysis

The analysis of the interview transcript data involved qualitative methodologies
for data reduction and data analysis. To reduce the data, the interview transcripts were
reviewed for statements related to the primary research question for this study. As the
form of the interview data was very open-ended, the review process was iterated several
times to properly capture those comments relating to this research. Once the statements
related to the primary research question were identified, another level of review was
conducted to determine how, or if, the identified responses related to any of the
secondary research questions. The result of this review was a categorization of responses
related to the applicable secondary research question. Each of these responses was
further reviewed to identify common themes amongst the responses. These themes were
evaluated in the context of opportunities to implement real options, benefits of real
options, and challenges to the implementation of real options.
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Program Overview

The following section provides a brief overview of the ORS initiative and the
TacSat experiments. The intent is to establish the context for the initiative and
experiments.
Overview of Operationally Responsive Space

In 2003, the Secretary of Defense initiated the Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS) initiative. The intent of the ORS initiative was to develop an affordable, rapid
reaction capability for space, optimized to support theater operations, surge, asset
reconstitution, augmentation of national assets, and support to global strike. The goal of
ORS was subsequently codified by Congress in Section 913 of Public Law 109-364, as
described in Table 11 ("National Defense Authorization Act of 2007," 2006).

Table 9 FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act
("National Defense Authorization Act of 2007," 2006)
SEC. 913. OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE
(a) UNITED STATES POLICY ON OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE
SPACE.—It is the policy of the United States to demonstrate, acquire, and deploy an
effective capability for operationally responsive space to support military users and
operations from space,
which shall consist of—
(1) responsive satellite payloads and busses built to common technical standards;
(2) low-cost space launch vehicles and supporting range operations that facilitate
the timely launch and on-orbit operations of satellites;
(3) responsive command and control capabilities; and
(4) concepts of operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures that permit the use of
responsive space assets for combat and military operations other than war.

The ORS concept was conceived as a transformational effort to address the
conflict between the operational utility and global utility of national space assets. The
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conflict exists in the execution and prioritization of high demand national satellite
systems, as these systems are tasked to support national, strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives. ORS proposes a strategy to addresses these conflicts with a flexible
and responsive architecture capable of meeting the urgent needs of the operational and
tactical levels of combat.
The transformational strategy for ORS specifies two objectives: responsiveness to
the tactical and operational levels of combat, and anticipation of rapid changes in threats
and technologies (OFT, 2006). The elements of ORS strategy for achieving these goals
are operational experimentation and execution. Operational experimentation is the
pairing of developmental technologies to operational concepts and the demonstration of
these pairings in an operational environment. Operational experimentation focuses the
development of technologies on the needs of the joint warfighter and enables the
evaluation of technologies before greater commitments are made. Execution establishes
the means for the rapid acquisition of low cost and relevant capabilities. Execution is
described as a joint effort between the services, Combatant Commanders (COCOMs),
laboratories, academia, and industry (OFT, 2006).
Tactical Satellite Experiments

The OFT initiated the TacSat experimental programs to demonstrate the core
concepts of ORS. The TacSat experiments employ co-evolutionary design techniques, as
depicted in Figure 15. This framework allows for the evaluation of learning options on
disruptive technologies and the refinement of technologies, concepts, and processes as
the experiments evolve. The objective of this approach is to hone the facets of ORS
through the TacSat experiments, so that the results can influence “technology, policy,
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concepts of operations, acquisition processes and public/private partnerships” (Statement
of Arthur K. Cebrowski Director of Force Transformation Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 2004).

Figure 15. Co-Evolutionary Strategy (OFT)

Four TacSat experiments have been planned as elements of this co-evolutionary
strategy. The goal of each TacSat experiment is to evaluate potential technologies and
concepts and to conduct operationally representative demonstrations. The highlights of
each experiment are listed in Table 12. Each TacSat experiment is designed to address
the broader system characteristics and design philosophies being explored by ORS:
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operationally relevant, automated micro-satellite bus, modular payloads, common
interfaces, SIPRNET dissemination, low-cost, and rapid-response launches.

Table 10 TacSat Experiments
Experiment
TacSat-1

Objectives
• Dual-mode target identification using Specific
Emitter Intelligence (SEI)

Organization
NRL for SD/OFT

TacSat-2

• MSI designed/built spacecraft bus

AFRL/VS

• Provides SEI, Automatic Identification Systems
& 1m optical resolution imagery directly to
tactical user
TacSat-3

• 7-day call-up to launch

AFRL/VS

• Hyperspectral and panchromatic Imagery directly
to tactical user
TacSat-4

• “Comm on the move”, Data exfiltration and Blue
Force tracking

NRL

• Provides communication augmentation to soldiers
in theatre

Summary

This chapter reviewed the research questions for this study, detailed the method
for conducting a case study to address the research questions, and addressed the methods
used for analyzing data collected for the case study. The discussion of data analysis
provided insight into how the results of this study were achieved. Details regarding the
results, conclusions, and recommendations will be presented in Chapter IV, Results, and
Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations. Finally, an overview of the ORS
initiative and the TacSat experiments was provided to offer insight and background on
the goals of the initiative and the means to achieving the stated goals.
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IV. RESULTS

Introduction

This chapter reviews the results of the case study on the Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) initiative and the efforts of the Tactical Satellite (TacSat) experiments. The
first section details the qualitative approach used for interview data analysis and presents
the initial results of categorizing responses and the identification of response themes.
The second section presents the results of the interview data analysis. The results
detailed will include the major themes identified within the interview responses, how
these themes relate to the secondary research questions, and insights into the predominant
themes identified in the interview responses.

Interview Data Analysis

The analyses of the interview transcripts required a qualitative mechanism to
extract, group, and organize relevant data. To conduct this qualitative analysis, the
researcher referenced the methods of grounded theory presented by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) and the processes for qualitative analysis presented by Miles and Huberman
(1994). These methodologies provide a means for the evaluation and examination of
qualitative data to identify themes and patterns as governed by the goals of the research
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The content of the interview transcripts were first reviewed to identify comments
and insights relating to the primary research question, identifying elements of the ORS
initiative and TacSat experiments amenable to the implementation of real options or
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presently exhibiting tenets of real options. Specific interest was placed on identifying
comments regarding the execution of flexible strategies, processes, and flexibility in
systems design. The initial analysis of the interview data identified 140 comments and
insights related to the goals of this investigation. These insights were evaluated to
identify those comments and insights with the strongest correlation to the research
questions. This evaluation eliminated 37 responses judged to be low in correlation to the
research questions. The final results of this effort were 103 responses identified as
relevant to the intent of the research questions.
The responses captured in these initial efforts were subsequently reviewed and
associated with the secondary research questions. The intent was to group the comments
and insights by the degree to which they addressed a particular secondary research
question. The process of relating these insights to the research questions yielded the
results depicted in Table 11.

Table 11 Number of Related Responses
Secondary Research Questions
How can the acquisition system apply a real options framework?

No. of Related
Responses
35

How can the acquisition system benefit from a real options framework?

24

What are the challenges to effectively implementing a Real Options
framework?
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Once the responses were matched with a research question, they were reviewed
to identify patterns and themes. The patterns observed in the responses were identified as
themes relating to the implementation, benefits, or challenges towards a real options
framework. Responses not fitting a particular pattern were also classified as a theme,
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with a response size of one. The results of pattern matching and theme identification are
depicted in Table 12.

Table 12 Response Themes
Secondary Research Questions
How can the acquisition system apply a real options framework?

Identified
Themes
5

How can the acquisition system benefit from a real options
framework?

7

What are the challenges to effectively implementing a Real Options
framework?

11

Structured Interview

This section addresses the analysis of transcript data from structured, open-ended
interviews conducted with members of the OFT and the AFRL TacSat program. The
objective of the interviews was to identify areas conducive to the implementation of real
options or presently exhibiting similar tenets of flexibility, by exploring the enabling
elements of the ORS initiative, such as processes, organizational structure and
stakeholder relationships. The review also sought to identify potential limitations or
impediments to the execution of a real options framework. The following discussions
will review the major themes discovered within these transcripts during analysis
Secondary Research Question #1 Observations

The first question, “how can the acquisition system apply a real options
framework,” focused on identifying opportunities within the acquisition system to
implement flexibility as described by the real options. In this context, flexibility is the
ability to efficiently implement change. Opportunities within the acquisition system
include, but are not limited to, organizational culture, organizational structure, policies,
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and processes. The analysis of the interview transcripts identified 38 responses related to
the first study question. A review of these responses identified five common themes, as
presented in Table 13. Of these five themes, the majority of the responses were related to
the themes of: an alternative business strategy, flexible response to future events, and
flexibility in system design.

Table 13 Opportunities for Real Options
Themes Relating to Opportunity
1. Alternative Business Strategy
2. Flexible Response To Future Events
3. Risk Analysis
4. Management Framework
5. Capitalize On Emerging Capabilities

Alternative Business Strategy
Discussions relating to the theme of an “alternative business strategy” identified
two focus areas: recognized deficiencies within existing processes and how a flexible
system would provide a better model, as presented in Table 14.
Two respondents commented on the elements within the acquisition system
process, the PPBS, and the acquisition policies, identifying them as unresponsive and
inflexible. One respondent described the PPBS as being slow and outdated. The
respondent reflected on the fact that the system was designed during the cold war and
evolved appropriately to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. However, the system is
incapable of meeting the needs of the current acquisition environment. The respondent
specifically noted that:
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McNamara's model which was of the right thing to do at the time, is now
crumbling under the rate of the increasing speed of the marketplace and
the lower barriers to competition in that marketplace.

•

Table 14 Alternative Business Strategy
Response Summaries
Existing model to slow for current market place

•

Current acquisition policies are prescriptive and limit flexibility

•

Value assessment input for POM

•

Determine strategic force mix

•

Invigorate Congress with new business strategy

•

ORS offers business model for operations and system acquisition

•

Gain flexibility through common standards accepted by industry

•

Develop systems/architecture to allow for future flexibility and new technologies

•

Process that responds to "user" market

•

Decision analysis for cost vs. capability trades

•

Technology risk reduction for large satellite development

The policies governing the acquisition process, specifically the DoDI 5000.1,
DoDI 5000.2, and the NSS 0301, were described as being too prescriptive. This
comment reflected the respondent’s view on guidance for large satellite developments as
compared to the philosophy being pursued under ORS. The respondent identified the
development requirements for large satellite systems as being driven by models defined
in policy, in contrast to the ability of the small satellite design for ORS to respond
flexibly to the needs of the user.
Nine respondents provided their insight on how flexibility could be applied to
improve our current process; several of these comments provided notable insights. The
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle was identified as an opportunity to
implement real options. One respondent asserted that real options should be used during
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the POM process to provide value assessments for capability and technology investments.
The respondent commented that, as currently structured, the POM makes commitments to
invest years in advance with little opportunity to change. As a result, the investments are
“rarely relevant…as things have changed dramatically.” The proposed value assessment
would allow for the investment opportunities to adjust as necessary.
Another respondent identified the need to use real options to develop flexible
architecture in our future weapon systems. The respondent asserted that real options
could be used to develop flexible architectures capable of integrating new technologies;
suggesting that a flexible architecture allows new capabilities to be integrated at a lower
cost:

Now, if you take the real options of saying, "OK, I have a platform that we
can't predict the future for, let's not even think that we can and be clever
about it. Let's design the architecture so that it can accept new things as
they emerge. Actually that saves us money right now, because I don't have
to buy the whole thing. I can accept things as they emerge. Also, because
I can accept new things, this allows me to change, based on the mission,
which then also decreases my cost, because I don't have to make a major
rework to something that was fully integrated.”

One respondent identified the need to create a business model that anticipates and is
responsive to the needs of the market. To accomplish this, the respondent suggested the
need to change the paradigm of our current system, from building large, expensive
systems to building small, cheap systems. These smaller, cheaper systems could be built
in greater quantities to satisfy a variety of needs in the market as well as adapted quickly
to address the reactions of the market.
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Flexible Response To Future Events
Discussions relating to the theme of a “flexible response to future events”
identified three focus areas: the need for flexible architectures, the ORS model for
flexibility, and modular standards, as presented in Table 15.

•

Table 15 Flexible Response To Future Events
Response Summaries
Develop systems/architecture to allow for future flexibility and new technologies

•

System architectures with longer life cycles must be flexible to exploit emerging
technology

•

ORS Enables tactical flexibility within operating environment

•

ORS Enables tactically responsive capabilities

•

ORS Three tiered architecture provides flexible response to user needs

•

ORS model requires modularity to accept future missions/payloads

•

Modularity supports quicker and more cost effective recapitalization

•

Modularity offers better integration of new technology and economies of scale

•

Gain flexibility through common standards accepted by industry

•

Build flexible standards and modules that do not limit future decisions

Several respondents provided comments on the need to develop systems with
flexible architectures. The comments were consistent in describing the need for systems
that effectively integrate new technologies, noting that this is an essential need as the rate
of technology increases. These comments were predicated upon the notion that although
existing systems are capable of integrating new technologies, the time and expense are
exceedingly high. One respondent commented that this issue will become increasingly
important as the number of systems we develop decreases and the age of these systems
increases.

60

Several respondents provided their insights on the ORS model for flexibility,
citing the advantages and benefits of this model. One respondent identified the ORS
three tiered approach to addressing capability needs, which is currently being discussed
by ORS stakeholders. The model proposes three tiers of responsiveness: 1) tier one
provides capabilities within hours, through the use of existing on-orbit assets; 2) tier two
provides capabilities within weeks or months, through the identification of systems
already at some level of integration; and 3) tier three which provides capabilities within a
year in response to unforeseen needs. Another respondent commented on the ability of
the ORS model to provide tactically and operationally responsive capability to
commanders in the field. The respondent noted a conversation with members of U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM):

And he looks at ORS from that aspect that we just talked about. You got a
marine tank commander scooting across a desert somewhere with a 50
year old map. And if you could, you know, quickly send a request to a
satellite to get an image of what's over the other side of the hill, or even
the day before you did your operation, you could say, "Give me a picture
of this city. I just need to know if the bridge is still there." That's the kind
of information he's looking for. So he looks at ORS very much from
getting information down, in his words, "The last tactical mile."

Several respondents identified modularity as a key concept for the ORS initiative and the
TacSat programs. The respondents commented that modularity is an enabling concept
for the ORS initiative because it allows for quicker and more cost effective integration of
technologies. Respondents universally advocated the concept of modularity, suggesting
that modular designs offered better integration of future technologies and better
economies of scale when compared to standardized buses. The limitations of
standardized buses, compared to modular buses, were noted several times as the
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respondents commented on standardized buses having less flexibility for integrating new
technologies. Specifically, respondents noted that standardized buses must be overdesigned in order to effectively integrate new technologies and as a consequence are not
economical in small quantities.

Risk Analysis
Discussions relating to the theme of “risk analysis” were broached in the context
of two program-specific issues: parts qualification and testing; and managing program
risks, as presented in Table 16.

•

Table 16 Risk Analysis
Response Summaries
Quantify risks for boss

•

Managing risk in light of need for program advocacy and funding

•

Radiation environment creates an unknown risk for certain components

•

Radiation testing for COTS parts

•

Cost of information

•

Need to balance objectives with customer expectations

•

Need to balance scope and risk

•

Need to balance risk in light of social and political expectations

•

Need to balance objectives with customer expectations

The respondents that provided comments relating to risk analysis were members
of a program team and identified specific instances within their program that either
required risk analysis or would benefit from risk analysis. One respondent identified an
issue within their program that required an evaluation of program risk versus the cost of a
particular test. For this issue, the respondent noted that a real options analysis would help
62

them quantify the value of their option to test; and provide them with the necessary
information to determine their next course of action. Two other respondents commented
on their need to balance the scope of their program efforts with the expectations of their
customers. Specifically, the respondents noted that as the scope of their program grew,
they did not effectively manage the risks of their commitments, which resulted in them
failing to satisfy all of their customer’s expectations. The respondents commented on the
need for an evolving risk analysis.
Secondary Research Question #2 Observations

The second question, “how can the acquisition system benefit from a real options
framework,” focused on identifying the particular benefits of implementing a flexible and
responsive systems framework, such as a real options framework. In this context,
benefits involve improvements to aspects of the acquisition system, such as processes and
policies that facilitate the execution of system design or systems acquisition. The
analysis of the interview transcripts identified 24 responses related to the second study
question. A review of these responses identified seven common themes, as presented in
Table 17. Of these seven themes, the majority of the responses were related to: an
alternative business strategy, flexible response to future events, and flexibility in system
design. As some of the themes identified for study questions one and two are similar,
the following discussions will address three different themes: create a business case for
industry, provide a rapid response to future events, and create learning options.
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Table 17 Benefits of Real Options
Themes Relating to Benefits
1. Alternative Business Strategy
2. Flexible Response To Future Events
3. Flexibility For System Design
4. Industry Business Case
5. Rapid Response To Future Events
6. Learning Option
7. Capitalize On Emerging Capabilities

Industry Business Case
Discussions relating to the theme of creating an “industry business case” focused
on the need to motivate the industrial base to support the goals of the ORS initiative, as
presented in Table 18.

•

Table 18 Industry Business Case
Response Summaries
Congressionally added resources to motivate industrial base

•

Driving the industrial base through development of standards

•

Opportunity to engage industrial base

A critical part of the ORS strategy is the development of a standard bus interface.
Developing a standardized bus interface would facilitate more efficient integration,
therefore enabling a wider variety of payloads to be integrated with the ORS satellites.
The intent of the strategy is to develop a government and industry standard. To facilitate
the development of this standard, a government and industry Integrated Systems
Engineering Team (ISET) was assembled to codify the standard.
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One respondent commented that pushing for modularity in ORS is setting the
pace for market standards. The respondent commented which industries that typically
supported large satellite developments would have to support the development of
components and systems for small satellites in order for the ORS strategy to realize the
benefits of modularity. As a result, the government would become a driving force for
industry investments:

The United States government, instead of imposing standards, is going to
start driving the market, because they are a large share of the market.

Another respondent commented on the benefits of having the industrial base supporting
modularity. The respondent noted that to achieve the type of flexibility envisioned by the
ORS initiative with a standardized bus would require a significant commitment of
resources as a result of the economies of scale. This would not present the proper case
for ORS as an affordable system. The respondent noted that with the support of
industrial base, the move to modularity would enable better economies of scale and
support the goal of quicker, cost effective capability:

Now, if you had some type of modular architecture, you can engage your
industrial base to start recapitalizing those assets in a much quicker and
more cost-effective way.

Another respondent identified that Congress also recognizes the need to stimulate the
industrial base to achieve the results of the ORS initiative. The respondent identified that
Congress provided $20-$25 million to invigorate second and third tier space providers to
support the ORS initiative.
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Learning Options
Discussions relating to the theme of creating “learning options” discussed benefits
of the ORS strategy for learning options, as presented in Table 19.

•

Table 19 Learning Option
Response Summaries
Plug and play reduces risk for large satellite industry

•

Buy down future risk

A respondent noted that a key element of the ORS strategy is the concept of
providing learning options by reducing technology risk through operational experiments.
The respondent noted that the TacSat programs are currently involved in experiments
involving plug and play components:

Whenever we're flying something we've got to smartly have technology
inserted into it in order to buy down where the future is. So TACSAT III
has elements of the plug and play satellite integrated into a secondary and
tertiary experiment…so even with these systems, you smartly insert the
next step, so you can always buy down your next evolution and see where
it fits.

Another respondent echoed these thoughts in their comments on the ability to leverage
technology for other industries. The respondent noted that plug and play components are
integral to the concept of a flexible and responsive satellite. In support of this concept,
the TacSat-III experiment is developing and demonstrating plug and play components
through operational experimentation. The respondent noted that knowledge gained by
this effort could be leveraged by large satellite industries to reduce risk in their
development efforts.
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Rapid Response To Future Events
Discussions relating to the theme of a “rapid response to future events” broadly
discussed topics relating to policies and initiatives that support this theme, as presented in
Table 20.

Table 20 Rapid Response To Future Events
Response Summaries
• Established four tech areas for responsive space
•

Responsive decision cycle

•

Quickly deliver low cost capability

A respondent identified that Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has
established four technology areas supporting the responsive space technology thrust:
plug and play modularity, TacSat II, TacSat III, and modeling and simulation.
A respondent discussed the notion of balancing power in space. The respondent
noted that as space technology proliferates, it is important for the DoD to be able to
respond “inside of the decision cycle” of any competition. The respondent further noted
that new space policy creates greater flexibility in ways to respond to space warfare. In
particular, the respondent noted that developing satellites that can be developed and
deployed at a very low cost would provide a significant advantage over competitors in
space.
Secondary Research Question #3 Observations

The third question, “what are the challenges to effectively implementing a real
options framework,” focused on identifying the challenges facing the ORS initiative that
would present similar challenges to a real options framework. In this context, challenges
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could be the result of social, political, or procedural impediments. The analysis of the
interview transcripts identified 44 responses related to the third study question. A review
of these responses identified 11 common themes, as presented in Table 21. Of these 11
themes, a majority of the responses were related to: competition and inertia,
standardization vs. modularity, and how to value flexibility in the DoD.

Table 21 Challenges to Implementing Real Options
Themes Relating to Challenges
1. Competition and Inertia
2.

Standardization Vs. Modularity

3.

How To Value Flexibility In the DoD

4.

Flexibility Is Expensive

5.

Process Limitations

6.

Need Organizational Support

7.

Need Industry Business Case

8.

Lack of Authority

9.

Flexibility Vs. Rapid Response

10. Scalability
11. Need Smart Buyers

Competition and Inertia
Discussions relating to the theme of “competition and inertia” identified three
focus areas: paradigm inertia, stakeholder conflict, and bad management decisions, as
presented in Table 22.
Several respondents identified the inertia caused by old paradigms as a challenge
to the changes proposed by ORS. The major causes of this inertia were identified as a
general lack of understanding or a reluctance to eliminate established competencies. One
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respondent noted that an organization when approached to develop a satellite for $10
million and launch it in a years time responded “we can’t do this,” as a result of their
previous experiences in satellite development. The respondent noted that this type of
resistance was a result of the organization’s concept of “the way it should be” and not a
lack of competence.

•

Table 22 Competition and Inertia
Response Summaries
Old Paradigms / Old Perspectives

•

Organizational Inertia

•

Old Paradigm Resistant To Change

•

Competing Interests With Lateral Stakeholder

•

Competing For Limited Funding

•

Conflict With Lateral Stakeholder

•

Disruptive Lateral Stakeholder

•

Stakeholder Disagrees With Concept

•

Stakeholder Friction

•

Contractors Will Resist Because Diminishes Earning Potential

•

Internal Pediment As Result Of Bad Management Decision

Another respondent acknowledged that an organization with a competing interest
presented a significant challenge. The respondent described the on-going debate on the
merits of standardization vs. modularity as a challenge to meeting the goals of the ORS
strategy. The respondent noted that the competing organization is recalcitrant because of
its “very well-defined lane in the road” competencies and processes and their desire to
maintain them. This competing organization was also identified as a disruptive
stakeholder because the organization has a stake in the success of the ORS initiative.
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Another respondent identified that the concept of ORS may infringe upon the
“rice bowl” of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The respondent suggested
that since the NRO is the principal provider of space capabilities for the nation, that the
concept of ORS might be identified as a challenge to the roles and missions of the NRO.
The respondent further noted that this issue depends on the perspective of the individual:

Part of it is that the viewpoint, when you look at ORS, depends very much
on where you sit. The NRO has a very good case to make that if the
commander of CENTCOM asks for information today, they can get it to
him very quickly. And there are virtually no requests that they're getting
today that are not being filled. And they can show that. And they have a
very valid point to make. So that's one viewpoint. If you go today and you
talk to a tank commander in -- pick your country. And you ask him what
kind of space imagery are you getting to support your operations, the
answer is none. Zero. We have zero space support. And so in between
there are two very different views.

Another responded noted that because of similar goals and objectives, organizations
involved in ORS and TacSat would likely compete for limited dollars, thereby potentially
creating conflicts between stakeholders.

Flexibility is Expensive
Discussions relating to the theme of “flexibility is expensive” broadly addressed
the debate regarding the expense of flexibility in the DoD, as presented in Table 23.
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Table 23 Flexibility Is Expensive
Response Summaries
•

Lack Of Funding

•

Is Congress Willing To Fund Large Scale Flexibility

•

It Costs More To Be Flexible

•

Require Funding Latitude To Purse Flexibility

A respondent noted that there are on-going debates addressing the scope of what
is possible with ORS if no additional funding is provided. The respondent commented
that “the barrier today is money; you can be completely flexible with more money.” It
was also noted that the enablers to achieving greater flexibility in ORS is minimizing the
amount of effort required and that there are current efforts to develop a bus strategy for
the ORS satellites that minimizes the expense and effort of integrating multiple payloads.
The respondent added that the question remains to be answered if Congress is willing to
fund larger scale efforts for developing a flexible system, “are they willing on a larger
scale to give that kind of flexibility, say $100 million?”

How to Value Flexibility in the DoD
Discussions relating to the theme of “rapid response to future events” identified
two focus areas, defining flexibility and quantifying flexibility, as presented in Table 24.
A respondent noted that a current challenge of the ORS initiative is clearly
establishing what flexibility means. The respondent noted that there are on-going debates
with USSTRATCOM to clarify the meaning of flexibility and, based on this definition,
when it can be achieved. In a similar response, another respondent noted that the major
challenge to implementing flexibility in future acquisition programs is a lack of tools and
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models to properly display, quantify, and evaluate flexible concepts without “emotional”
debates.

Table 24 How To Value Flexibility In DoD
Response Summaries
•

Debating Definition Of Flexibility

•

Lack Mechanisms To Diffuse Emotional Response

•

How Do You Quantify The Level Of Flexibility Needed

•

How Do You Value These Decision Trees

•

Existing Systems Architecture Set, Not Amenable To Optionality

•

What Is The Data That's Going To Trigger The Option Decision

Several respondents provided comments on the challenges to valuing flexibility.
One respondent noted that a principal challenge is determining what level of flexibility
should be applied in a system and how it should be valued. This issue is a point of
discussion in the design of the modular systems, determining whether modularity should
be applied at the component or subsystem level. Another respondent posed the question,
how do you put value on decision trees evaluating concepts like a tiered architecture of
large sat, microsat, aerostat, and UAV; subsequently asserting that no one has attempted
this analysis.

Summary

This chapter offered a comprehensive review of the observations and findings of
the case study conducted on the ORS initiative and the TacSat experiments. The results
offered insights into the opportunities, benefits, and challenges of implementing a
flexible and responsive satellite system architecture. These results also offer some

72

insight into the potential for applying flexible strategies, such as a real options
framework, on a potentially larger scale in other acquisition programs. The final chapter
will review the conclusions and recommendations formulated as a result of this
investigation.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

The primary research objective for this study was to explore the opportunities for
implementing a real options framework in the DoD acquisition system. The secondary
objectives were to identify how real options could be implemented, to qualify the benefits
of this implementation, and to identify potential challenges or impediments. The
principal instrument for evaluating these research objectives was a case study of the
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) initiative and its Tactical Satellite (TacSat)
experiments. This initiative was selected for observation because elements of its strategy
offered similar comparisons to the concepts of real options. This chapter will present the
conclusions of this research, identify limitations to this research method and offer,
recommendations for further evaluation.

Conclusions

The primary objective of this research was to identify opportunities within the
acquisition system for adapting a real options framework. The secondary objectives were
to identify: how real options could be applied within the acquisition system, the potential
benefits to be reaped from implementing real options, and the challenges within the
acquisition system that could impede implementation. It is this researcher’s belief that
the research goals for this study were met and the results of this effort will provide
motivation for additional study into the nascent concept of real options in the DoD
acquisition system.
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The primary research question sought to identify opportunities within the DoD
acquisition system for the implementation of a real options framework. The ORS
initiative provided an ideal case study for this investigation. The core intent of the ORS
initiative to develop and demonstrate a system architecture for providing flexible
responses to the dynamic needs of the Combatant Commanders bears similarities to the
characteristics of an organization that could gain value from the implementation of a real
options framework. This intent bears similarity to the two elements described by
Copeland and Keenan (1998b): an operating environment with a high degree of
uncertainty and the likelihood that new information will be discovered and the ability of
organizational management to strategically respond to this new information. The
interviews conducted with members involved in the ORS initiative provided specific
insights into these elements and intent, describing how the strategy for this initiative
contributes to the improvement of the acquisition process and support to the warfighters.
The concepts of an alternative business strategy, the need for flexibility to respond to
future events, the importance of flexible system designs, and the need for improved
methods of risk analysis were predominant in the comments provided by these
respondents. Despite the stated benefits and gains proposed by the ORS initiative and the
development efforts of the TacSat programs, the respondents also identified several
particular challenges to the execution of the ORS vision. Of particular interest were the
respondent’s acknowledgments of the challenges posed by lateral stakeholders with
competing interests and motivations to maintain the status quo, the challenge of
appropriately assessing the value of flexibility for the DoD, and the perception that
flexibility is expensive.
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The ORS case study offered five propositions for the implementation of a flexible
framework such as real options. Of these five propositions, several were given particular
emphasis: alternative business strategy emphasizing flexibility, system architectures and
design philosophies focused on flexibility, and the need to improve our ability to evaluate
investment risks. In the context of an alternative business strategy, the emphasis was
placed on providing greater flexibility in our processes and practices. The key notion
expressed was that our current processes are too restrictive and incapable of responding
to the rapidly evolving needs of our combat forces and the asymmetries of our current
security environment. It was also suggested that future systems and system architectures
would require increasing levels of flexibility to adapt to the rapidly changing security
environment, as the asymmetric threats that we face require the ability to dynamically
adapt to remain competitive. Finally, it was suggested that real options could be
employed as both a systems management and a systems engineering tool to evaluate
risks. Specifically, a real options evaluation at the systems management level could
provide a means for quantifying and evaluating programmatic investment decisions; and
real options “in” could be applied in the analysis of design trades for complex systems to
identify and the quantify decisions regarding flexibility to accommodate future changes.
The review of the ORS initiative identified seven potential benefits of a flexible
framework such as real options. Several of these proposed benefits were given particular
emphasis: alternative business strategy emphasizing flexibility, system architectures and
design philosophies focused on flexibility, and the ability of flexibly designed systems to
integrate future technologies and capabilities. The benefit of an alternative business
model utilizing a real options framework is the ability to respond to the urgent and
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changing needs of the user market. Specifically, through the use of a real options
framework, the acquisition system would be better suited to evaluate and consider
investment opportunities to reduce development risk and provide capabilities in a timely
manner to its customers. Finally, it was suggested that our future systems and system
architectures would require upfront design considerations for integrating emerging
technologies. As current and future systems remain in our inventory for longer periods of
time, the need to integrate new technologies and capabilities with less effort and expense
will become a critical element of our ability to maintain our competitive advantages.
The ORS case study identified 11 challenges experienced in the execution of the
responsive space transformational strategy, which could also serve as impediments to the
implementation of a real options framework. Of these challenges, several were given
particular interest: competition and inertia, the expense of flexibility, and the means of
valuing flexibility in the DoD. Resistance to change was identified as the most
significant challenge faced by the ORS initiative and would likely be the greatest
challenge facing the adoption of a real options framework. It was suggested that the
introduction of new ideas and ways of conducting business could conflict with the
established competencies of related organizations and lead to conflicting paradigms. This
type of paradigm inertia could preclude effective execution if the conflict is with lateral
stakeholders in supporting or supported positions. Conflict could arise from
organizations with competing interests or conflicting processes, which could also lead to
programmatic inertia. Efforts to implement a real options framework would likely
encounter similar levels of resistance and programmatic conflicts.
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The cost of system flexibility was also identified as a potential challenge to the
implementation of flexibility in system design. Although flexibility was identified as a
strategically important concept in the execution of systems acquisition efforts and the
design of engineering systems, the costs of this flexibility and the willingness of the
Congress to fund it was identified as a limiting factor. As the concept of real options
relies on the execution of options to provide flexibility to respond to future uncertainties,
the willingness of the DoD and the Congress to fund this additional level of flexibility
must be a major consideration in the execution of a real options framework.
Finally, determining the value of flexibility for DoD systems was identified as a
specific limitation for the real options framework. There are two elements to this
limitation: identifying the appropriate measures for using real options as an analytical
framework and determining the appropriate means to qualitatively value flexibility. The
derivation of equivalent measures for stock price, risk free rates of return, time to
expiration, and volatility is a difficult measure for the defense environment as there are
no clear corollaries. Lacking the appropriate measures to quantitatively value flexibility,
it was suggested that a qualitative measure would be the necessary. However,
agreements on the appropriate measures and the necessary tools to properly determine
this value were also identified as shortcomings.
In conclusion, it is the researcher’s opinion that these observations provide an
indication of the opportunities and benefits of implementing a real options framework.
The adoption of a real options framework in our acquisition management framework
would offer the benefit of better execution of acquisition program investment
opportunities. By exercising the appropriate options at a program milestone, such as
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deferring or abandoning poorly performing programs, the acquisition system can achieve
a better focus on the capabilities that generate the greatest value to the warfighting
customers. This concept offers particular benefits during the early program phases of
Science and Technology (S&T) investments and Concept Refinement. It provides an
incentive to explore more technologies and concepts without the need for further
commitments if results prove unfavorable. As expressed in the ORS strategy, these
“learning options” also generate value because the knowledge gained can be applied to
other related efforts. The design of flexible systems and system architectures also offer
potentially substantial benefits. With fewer large scale development efforts, greater
monetary commitments per development effort, and the likelihood of longer service lives,
flexible system designs afford the acquisition community and its customers the
opportunity to keep the available systems competitive and relevant in the face of a
dynamic security environment. In concert with this notion is the idea that flexible
systems can integrate new technologies and capabilities quicker and at a lower cost than
what is currently capable. This affords the warfighter the option to economically pursue
newer capabilities sooner, instead of waiting for planned major upgrades. Finally, the
concept of a real options framework presents the DoD with an opportunity to inculcate
the notion of flexibility, a key concept for defense transformation, in its processes,
practices, and systems.

Limitations of Study

As previously mentioned, the principal limitations to this study are the choice of a
case study design and the qualitative methods used to analyze the interview data. The
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inductive, exploratory case study design used for this study has several limitations. First,
although exploratory research provides provocative insights and hypothesis for further
study, it does not lend itself to yielding actionable, decision-making insight. As a result,
the conclusions and recommendations provided by this study will require additional
exploration to validate. Additionally, exploratory case study designs have limited
external validity. It is generally accepted that these types of studies are limited to
generalizations to theory (Yin, 2003). Finally, construct validity for case studies is often
criticized due to its lack of sufficient operational measures and the subjective nature in
which data is collected (Yin, 2003).
The interview analysis for this case study also presented two significant
limitations. The first limitation is the interview data used for this study. The form of the
interview subject responses, as open-ended discussions or statements, limited the degree
to which responses could be clearly categorized with investigative questions. As a result,
a qualitative method was used to identify responses and themes related to the research
questions. The methods utilized to identify related responses and to determine the themes
within the responses was highly subjective and relied on the researcher’s knowledge and
opinion. These methods may inject researcher bias into the results of the study. Finally,
the qualitative approach to interview data analysis may limit the ability of future
researchers to repeat the results of this study.

Recommendations

The examination of the ORS initiative and the TacSat experiments identified
several efforts to improve the business model for the development and delivery of
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satellite capability for the operational and tactical levels of combat. The efforts identified
by these transformational activities were the shift from large scale, unique, low number
satellite developments to small, standardized, modular satellite systems produced in large
quantities; as well as the notion of early exploration of concept and technology pairings.
This premise of an alternative business model was also expressed by the interview
subjects and identified as the principal opportunity and benefit of a flexible system
framework such as a real options framework. The particulars regarding the
implementation of a new business model were not explicitly stated; however, several
notions were offered that would benefit from further exploration.
The examination of literature on real options and the review of the
transformational strategy for ORS identified a common theme: creating value through the
creation of options. It is this researcher’s opinion that the current acquisition
environment is becoming less conducive to the execution of long development cycle,
large scale acquisition programs. As systems become more complex and the rate of
technology continues to increase, the impact of long development cycles and the expense
of large scale acquisition programs will likely become more pronounced. Flexible and
responsive business processes were identified as a key concept for the ORS initiative and
a significant observation of the interviews, particularly through the execution of small
scale, high volume acquisitions. This strategy focused on achieving lower budget
requirements and faster, more flexible, response times. The exploration of similar
strategies in other acquisition programs, such as creating program value through the
creation options, offers the opportunity to explore alternative philosophies and strategies
for the acquisition business model.
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The ORS strategy of operational experimentation presented a method to assess
technologies and operational concepts in a minimum risk environment. By conducting
these efforts in an iterative manner, prior to the execution of an acquisition effort, the
ORS initiative can identify promising technologies for further investment or identify
those not sufficiently mature. These “learning options” also offer the benefit of reducing
risk for the operational capability, as the testing in an operational environment provides
the warfighters with the opportunity to witness actual system performance. An added
benefit of these early risk reduction efforts is the knowledge gained by programs utilizing
similar technologies or concepts, such as the industrial base, and their ability to gain
leverage from the early, exploratory efforts. It is this researcher’s recommendation that
the concept of “learning options” or operational experimentation be further explored for
use on other acquisition programs.
The examination of the ORS initiative and the TacSat experiments also identified
the need for flexibility in our acquisition system processes and system designs to respond
to unanticipated future events and to capitalize on emerging technologies. The ORS
strategy for achieving these goals relies upon the development of standardized satellite
buses and the use of modular systems, as well as cooperative investigations into
technologies and concepts with the acquisition community, operational community, and
industry. Although there are current efforts within the DoD to execute such frameworks,
the proposals and strategies of the ORS initiative offer additional perspectives on a means
to achieve a flexible and responsive system. It is this researcher’s recommendation that
organizational processes and systems design philosophies expressed in the ORS initiative
be examined for applicability to other acquisition programs.
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This study offered an exploratory look at the potential for a real options
framework in the DoD acquisition system. Based on the results and conclusions of this
study there are several possible areas of future study. These additional areas of study
include: development of a quantitative framework for evaluation of real options in the
defense acquisition system, development of a quantitative framework for conducting a
real options “in” evaluation of an engineered system for a defense acquisition program,
and identification and codification of guidance and policy for the implementation of a
real options framework within acquisition programs at the systems management level and
the systems engineering level.
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Appendix 1: Investigative Questions

QUESTIONS ABOUT SYSTEM STAKEHOLDERS:
Who are your stakeholders/customers inside the organization?
Who are your stakeholders/customers outside the organization?
How have the stakeholders changed over time?
What is the impetus for these changes?
Who are the future stakeholders of the system?
What capabilities do they desire?
Are they different from existing capabilities?
QUESTIONS ABOUT ORGANIZATION:
Who in the organization requires information from you?
Who in the organization requires product from you?
Who in the organization requires money from you?
Who in the organization delivers information to you?
Who in the organization delivers product to you?
Who in the organization delivers money to you?
(Follow on questions seeking to describe the nature of these interactions)
How has the organization changed over time?
What was the impetus for these changes?
QUESTIONS ABOUT SYSTEM OBJECTIVES:
Are the objectives for the system defined/documented? If so, may I see them?
What do perceive are the objectives for the stakeholders you described above?
What are your objectives for the system?
What do you perceive are your customer’s objectives?
What are the organization’s objectives?
How have the system objectives changed over time?
What was the impetus for these changes?
QUESTIONS ABOUT SYSTEM ACTIVITIES:
Do you have a work breakdown structure/documents that describe your activities?
If so, (may I see them) are these documents accurate? What are the deviations? Explain.
What activities do you perform for your job?
What activities do you perform to support your objectives?
What activities do you perform to support your internal customers’ objectives?
What activities do you perform to support your external customers’ objectives?
What activities are required in order for you to perform your activities?
What activities are affecting your activities?
Describe the nature of these affects/interactions
What activities are affected by your activities?
Describe the nature of these interactions
What are the attributes/measures of performance for your activities?
How have the activities changed over time?
What was the impetus for these changes?
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QUESTIONS ABOUT ENGINEERED SYSTEM:
What elements in the engineered system are your responsibilities?
What elements in the engineered system are affected by your elements?
What elements in the engineered system affect you elements?
Describe the nature of these interactions?
What are the key system parameters for the elements under your responsibility?
What are the attributes of engineered systems?
How has the engineered system changed over time?
What was the impetus of these changes?
Thinking back through the design iterations of previous systems…which elements
in the physical structure has changed most (least)? Why was the driving force behind the
changes (customer needs, innovation, architectural philosophy, other)
QUESTIONS ABOUT SYSTEM DRIVERS:
What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the system
objectives?
What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the organization?
What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the engineered
system?
What are the factors beyond your control have the greatest impact on the activities?
What is the nature of these interactions?
How rapidly is the technology supporting the system changing?
How have the operational requirements for the system changed, likely to change?
What was the impetus of these changes?
What are your greatest cost risks? Schedule risks? Performance risks?
What do you consider the greatest impediments to your program’s success? (FAR, Cost
Instability, Organization)
What do you consider the greatest enablers?
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONTRACT STRATEGY/EXECUTION:
What was the contracting strategy chosen for the TacSat-1 program? Please provide a
description of the contract type(s) used. Please identify significant contract options
included. Please identify significant contract schedule events.
Were any FAR/DFAR waivers requested and granted? Please identify which waivers
were requested and granted.
Were any DoD 5000 waivers requested and granted? Please identify which waivers were
requested and granted.
Are TactSat-2 through TacSat-6 contracted as follow-on pre-planned product
improvement (P3I) efforts under the original contract? If no, what is the contracting
strategy planned for these follow-on efforts (Reference Question 1)?
Were the contract(s) executed for TacSat-1 competitively selected or sole source? If sole
source, what justification was used?
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QUESTIONS ABOUT ACQUISITION STRATEGY:
What was the acquisition strategy chosen for the TacSat-1 program?
What, if any, acquisition initiatives have been employed (Cost As an Independent
Variable, performance based procurements requirements, commercial standards and
products, etc.)?
What, if any, critical events were required at program decision milestones?
Has a transition plan developed to move from experimentation to full-scale acquisition
program?
QUESTIONS ABOUT PROGRAM EXECUTION:
Was program funding identified and committed for the entirety of the program or was
out-year funding, if any, not committed?
Were key program decisions/trades executed at the oversight level or the program
execution level?
ADDITIONAL KEY QUESTIONS:
What are the major sub-systems of the TacSat spacecraft?
What are the key interfaces (mass, energy, information and authority) that connect these
sub-systems?
What are the key expected system changes during operational life? Description of the
pace and variety of those changes
How do such system changes (e.g. payload swap-out, bus changes, launch vehicles
adaptation, communication system adaptation) propagate through the system?
How was the sub-system architecture developed? What were some alternative
architectures? Who made the choice? On what criteria?
Repeat the above for each version of TacSat (1-6)
How does TacSat fit within the larger defense space establishment as a system?
What are the key external interfaces of the TacSat?
Does the TacSat participate in any systems-of-systems? Describe the interfaces between
TacSat and the other constituents systems?
How does TacSat fit within the larger defense space establishment as a program?
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